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Federal Class Action Reform in the United
States: Past and Future and Where Next?
If the past is prologue, then there will be many proposals, some tinkering,
some substantive, some legislative, to change class action practice
By Edward H. Cooper

P

ments
in classtheaction
in the
REDICTING
likely practice
future developfederal courts of the United States must begin in the past.
THE PAST: OR WHERE
WE'RE NOT GOING NEXT
A. The 1966 Class Action
The beginning point is the complete revision of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure that took effect in 1966.
This revision instituted the familiar Rule
23(b)(1) and (b)(2) "mandatory" classes
and the much more pervasive (b)(3) "optout" class. There has been little excitement
about the (b)(1) class, apart from the currently unsuccessful attempts to adapt it to
"limited fund" mass tort litigation. The
(b)(2) class was a central focus of the 1966
revisions, which were designed to entrench
the then-growing use of class actions to enforce civil rights through injunctions. Although there is some concern today about
efforts to expand (b)(2) class actions to
embrace individual damages claims as "incidental" to class-based injunctive relief,
there is no general dissatisfaction with it.
Broad class-based injunctions, often involving "institutional reform," are widely
accepted.
The opt-out Rule(b)(3) class is a different story. It was invented in a moment of
inspiration. Several participants in the process that developed (b)(3) tell us today that
they had not the slightest idea what it
would become. That may be in part because it has become many things.
One common description of the variety
of (b)(3) class actions focuses on the ap-
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parent monetary value of individual class
member claims. The "consumer" class action is often described as one needed to
ensure enforcement of rights that involve
sums too small to support effective enforcement through individual actions. The
"mass tort" class action is described as one
that brings together large claims that could
and often would support individual actions.
In between lie "mixed" actions that include
in one class both members whose claims
would and others whose claims would not
support individual litigation.
Another description of the variety of
(b)(3) class actions focuses on the subject
matter involved. Antitrust and securities
litigation are most frequently mentioned as
examples of well-developed class action
practice, where this procedural device is
working well. Much greater problems are
seen in attempts to bring class action procedure to bear on mass torts.
It did not take long for Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions to make an impression. Lawyers and courts worked together to make
"class action" a household word. The potentially neutral observation that they had
multiplied "like the leaves of the green bay
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tree" was followed by more darkling observations about "legalized blackmail" and
"Frankenstein monsters."
Some areas of the law were transformed,
if not in substantive meaning, then in realworld meaning. Much of the reaction to
class actions flowed from this impact. Enthusiasts lauded the opportunity for more
effective enforcement of "public interest"
legislation. Detractors, perhaps unwilling
to voice directly their displeasure with the
substantive law, talked instead of the compulsion to settle unfounded class claims.
Settlements are coerced, they complain, by
at least two major factors. One is the staggering cost of defending class litigation.
The second is the risk that even a completely unfounded claim will be sustained
in litigation-a risk, they say, that arises
not only from the prospect of an occasional
aberrant result but also from a subtle pressure exerted by the class action itself. On
this view, it is more difficult to say "no"
when a claim is advanced on behalf of
many people. Together, the cost of defending and even a small risk of a very large
loss exert powerful pressure to settle.
Substantive law objections also were
voiced. The most direct expression is that
much modern regulatory legislation is
drafted in deliberately broad and ambiguous terms. Teams of lawyers may work unceasingly at the task of complying but still
guess wrong as to the eventual judicial decision. The consequence is not only an occasional undeserved loss but also routine
over-compliance that imposes costs on the
persons intended to benefit from the regulation.
B. Reform Efforts: 1970s
By the early 1970s, calls were made to
reform class action practice. The Civil
Rules Advisory Committee of the United
States Judicial Conference, after flirting
with some of the proposals, deliberately
put the subject aside. It returned to Rule 23
only in 1991, when the Judicial Conference
reacted to the report of an ad hoc committee on asbestos litigation by asking that the
rules committees consider the possible ad-

Page 433

aptation of class action procedure as a
means to address the tens of thousands of
asbestos claims.
The first response was the drafting of a
complete revision of Rule 23 that collapsed
the conceptual distinctions that had divided
Rule 23 into the (b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3)
categories. The formulas that had defined
these categories were incorporated into a
longer list of factors to be considered in
determining whether to certify a class. The
court was authorized to permit or instead to
prohibit opting out from any class and to
impose conditions on opting out. As an alternative, the court could define an "optin" class to include only those who affirmatively request inclusion. This bold
proposal was at first recommended for
publication but then retracted for further
consideration.
C. Reform Efforts: 1996
The next phase considered more modest
changes in the criteria for class certification. Some of the proposed changes were
put aside. Two deserve mention. One
would have retained opt-out classes, but
created an opt-in class that might be used
as an alternative. Another would have permitted a preliminary evaluation of the merits in deciding whether to certify a class.
This proposal, initially supported by some
defendant representatives, collapsed when
plaintiffs and defendants joined in opposition. Defendants expressed two major concerns-that even a preliminary consideration of the merits would inevitably lead to
complete discovery on the merits before a
certification decision could be made, and
that a certification based on a prediction
that the plaintiffs have a good chance of
winning would exert irresistible pressure to
settle. Many other changes also were considered, including a reconsideration of the
conceptual foundations of class litigation.
The culmination of this second phase
came with the publication for comment of
several relatively modest proposals that included revisions of the class certification
criteria for Rule 23(b)(3). The list of matters pertinent to determining whether a
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class action is a superior method of fair and
efficient adjudication was expanded to include factors with an obvious bearing on
mass tort claims: the practical ability of individual class members to pursue their
claims without class certification, class
members' interests in maintaining or defending separate actions, and the maturity
of related litigation.
These factors drew much attention, but
even greater attention was attracted by the
final factor, a proposed Rule 23(b)(3)(f),
which authorized the court to consider
"whether the probable relief to individual
class members justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation." This factordubbed by some with affection and by
others with scorn as the "just-ain't-worthit" approach-was assailed in much of the
public testimony and comments as an open
invitation to defeat the public enforcement
interest whenever countered by the individual predilections of a particular judge.
But this factor also was supported vigorously by others who saw it as an opportunity to win some relief from class actions
brought only to benefit the class lawyers.
The opposition included frequent arguments that public enforcement of the public
interest through the private attorney general provisions of Rule 23(b)(3) has become so much a part of our substantive law
that only Congress can change it, and that
Congress, far from wishing change, has relied on the provisions of present Rule
23(b)(3) in enacting much post-1966 legislation.
In any event, these proposals were abandoned.
Another 1996 proposal also was put
aside for an indefinite period. This would
have created a new category, Rule 23(e)(4),
permitting a class action to be maintained
if "the parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b)(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not
be met for purposes of trial."
Opponents of this proposal argued that it
would limit settlement-class certification to
the most dangerous form of all, involving a

"deal" ready-made between defendants and
representative plaintiffs who would have
nothing unless they bargained down to
terms more favorable to the defendant than
any other plausible representative might
concede. Soon after this proposal was published the Supreme Court addressed the
subject of settlement classes. The Advisory
Committee decided to withhold further
consideration pending further development
of the Supreme Court's approach in lower
court practice.
The only reform that actually emerged
from the 1996 proposals was adoption of a
new Rule 23(f) that authorizes a court of
appeals to permit an interlocutory appeal
from an order granting or denying class
certification. This rule appears to be working well. Several courts of appeals have announced detailed criteria guiding their discretion in determining whether to permit an
appeal. A steady stream of appeals seems
to be providing greater clarity in certification doctrine and greater uniformity in
practice.
D. Mass Torts
The next step involved creation of an ad
hoc working group on mass torts composed
of representatives from several Judicial
Conference committees under the leadership of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee. The chair of the working group, Judge
Anthony J. Scirica, was then a member of
the Advisory Committee and now chairs
the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to
which the Advisory Committee submits its
proposals.
The working group held four large-scale
conferences that drew participation from a
large number of the most experienced class
action practitioners, judges, and academics.
It produced a lengthy report and a thick
appendix of possible reform approaches.
Many of the approaches would require
action by Congress, and many of the possible changes in court rules would be more
easily accomplished in conjunction with
legislative reform. These topics may come
back to the civil rules committee.
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WHERE WE ARE NOW:
CURRENT RULE 23 PROPOSALS
Several Rule 23 amendments were published by the Advisory Committee for
comment in August 2001. Two public
hearings produced several hundred pages
of testimony from more than three dozen
witnesses. Nearly 100 written comments
were provided. Many of the written comments came from bar groups and even collections of bar groups; the total number of
lawyers involved surely runs into multiples
of 100.
If these proposals survive in the Judicial
Conference itself, and then the Supreme
Court, which must promulgate them, and
then are not interdicted by Congress, they
will take effect on December 1, 2003.
Many of them, however, can be implemented by emulation before they take effect. Many of them, indeed, represent the
surest form of rulemaking by adoptingand perhaps clarifying and regulating-the
best current practices. The settlement review provisions in particular may have
salutary effects in engendering careful review within the present framework, and
thus encouraging worthy settlement agreements.
All of these proposals aim at the procedures for conducting class litigation, not at
the criteria for determining whether to certify a class. In common with many recent
proposals, they have been informed by empirical work. The Federal Judicial Center
did a study of class actions in four highactivity courts and is carrying out another
study now. The Rand Institute for Civil
Justice did an empirical survey and an indepth analysis of 10 class actions. The
Rand study, in line with a great amount of
less rigorously assembled empirical information, emphasizes the importance of class
counsel, including fee practices, and of judicial review of class action settlements.
Many of the current proposals were shaped
by these studies.
A. Rule 23(c)
The changes to Rule 23(c) are relatively
modest. The time for making a certification

decision is changed from "as soon as possible" to "at an early practicable time." The
Advisory Committee note addresses the
need to adjust the timing of a certification
determination to the need for sufficient information about the nature of the claims
and issues that actually will be tried. There
should be sufficient discovery about the
merits to illuminate the probable nature of
the action without courting undue delay
and without wastefully detailed discovery.
As published, the proposal would have
required notice to a reasonable number of
class members in a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class.
Multiple protests were made that this requirement would cripple many civil rights
class actions. In response, the notice provision was reduced to a statement that the
court may direct notice in a (b)(1) or (b)(2)
class action. The note emphasizes the need
to balance the value of notice against the
practical impediment to maintaining the
action and suggests consideration of inexpensive means of notice.
B. Rule 23(e)
Rule 23(e) is completely rewritten to
emphasize the court's responsibilities in reviewing a proposed settlement. The first
paragraph establishes criteria for notice to
class members and for approval. The published version explicitly required court approval for a voluntary dismissal, withdrawal or settlement before a certification
decision. Many comments reinforced initial doubts about the court's ability to do
anything effective by way of refusing approval when the only parties before it join
in refusing to pursue the litigation further.
The amended version proposed for adoption explicitly limits the approval requirement to a dismissal or settlement that
would bind a certified class.
C. Rule 23(e)(2)
Rule 23 (e)(2) is entirely new. As published, it authorized the court to direct the
parties to file a summary or copy of any
agreement or understanding made in connection with a proposed settlement. The
concern was that "side deals" may trade off
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class relief for other advantages. Many of ject to a proposed settlement and requires
the witnesses and comments urged that the court approval to withdraw an objection.
parties to a settlement be required to in- The published Advisory Committee note
form the court of these agreements, argu- explored in some detail the prospect that a
ing that a court is least likely to learn of the court might wish to ensure adequate proceagreements it would most want to have dural support for objectors. These comfiled.
ments descended from early drafts that exThe amended version directs the parties pressly provided discovery and attorney
to identify any agreement made in connec- fee support for objectors. Those drafts met
tion with a proposed settlement. The deter- substantial resistance; objectors tend not to
mination whether an agreement is made "in be popular with either plaintiffs or defenconnection with" a settlement will not al- dants. Even as reduced to general note obways be easy; any reasonable doubt should servations, much concern was expressed
be resolved in favor of identifying the about these note passages. They will be
agreement. The parties who identify an substantially reduced.
agreement are free to argue that in fact it
Another deletion from the settlement redid not affect the settlement terms. The view provisions may be noted. Early drafts
Advisory Committee note observes that the included a provision explicitly authorizing
court has discretion whether to direct filing appointment of a court adjunct to investiand to protect interests of confidentiality or gate and report on a proposed settlement.
privilege.
In substance, this officer would perform
the role of dispassionate objector. This proD. Rule 23(e)(3)
posal met several objections, chief among
Rule 23(e)(3) also is entirely new and them being concern that this investigatory
represents a significant innovation. It au- function might not be compatible with the
thorizes a court to refuse to approve settle- court's neutral role as umpire, and fear that
ment of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action unless appointments would degenerate into a
the settlement affords class members a sec- "buddy" system.
ond opportunity to request exclusion from
the class after a settlement is proposed, F. Rule 23(g)
even though an initial opportunity to reRule 23(g) is entirely new. It confirms
quest exclusion has expired. This provision the court's responsibility to appoint class
may make it more difficult to settle some counsel, separating this function from its
cases, although settlements have been present place as part of the Rule 23(a)(4)
reached in many cases before certification assurance that the class representative will
and thus with the certain knowledge that represent class interests fairly and adclass members must be afforded an oppor- equately. Changes made after publication
tunity to request exclusion. The purpose is illustrate the variety of concerns addressed.
to permit exclusion at a time when class The criteria for appointment were exmembers have clear information on the panded to ease the way for appointment of
consequences of remaining in the class and good lawyers with little or no class action
a real incentive to think about the matter.
experience.
There is some prospect that competing
The Advisory Committee note discuscounsel will mount concerted campaigns to sions of the need for counsel to act on besolicit exclusions, but it is difficult to pre- half of the putative class before a certificadict how often that will happen or what the tion determination is made were adopted as
consequences might be.
a new rule provision authorizing designation of interim counsel to act on behalf of a
E. Rule 23(e)(4)
proposed class. A provision expressly auRule 23(e)(4) is quite modest. It simply thorizing the court to allow a reasonable
confirms the right of a class member to ob- period for applications to represent the
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class was deleted in response to protests
that it would encourage courts to stir up
competition for appointment where competition is not useful. These changes leave the
heart of the proposal intact.
Rule 2 3(g) also anticipates the attorney
fee provisions of new Rule 23(h) by providing that the order appointing class counsel may include provisions about the award
of attorney fees.
G. Rule 23(h)
Rule 23(h) is not dramatic. It confirms
the authority to award reasonable attorney
fees "authorized by law or by agreement of
the parties." It does not attempt to establish
any new basis for fee awards, nor does it
take sides in the continuing struggle between "percentage" and "lodestar" methods for calculating fees. It does establish a
regularized procedure that provides greater
detail than the general attorney fee procedure of Civil Rule 54(d), and it requires
separate findings of fact and conclusions of
law under Civil Rule 52(a).
WHERE WE MAY BE GOING:
LEGISLATION ON MULTIPLE
CLASS ACTIONS?
The next steps should be divided between Congress and the rule-making process. Congress has taken a renewed interest
in class actions, as exemplified by bills to
change the allocation of jurisdiction over
class actions between state and federal
courts. Changes such as this cannot come
through the rule-making process. Other
changes might address the relationship between state and federal class actions
through court rules, but the course of wisdom may be to defer to Congress.
A look at the most prominent issues illustrates the point.
Many defendants have protested that the
states have established a "universal venue
system" for nationwide class actions. It is
not just that plaintiffs are free to bring a
single action in the most promising court;
nor is it just that a single court may choose
to inflict its own view of the law on all
other states, no matter how tenuous its con-
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nection to most of the claims or events and
no matter how eccentric its view of the law
may be. It is that multiple actions can be
brought.
At least three major variations are commonly identified. In one, the same attorneys or a cooperating group of attorneys
file several actions at more or less the same
time, intending to press forward in the
court that seems most favorable as the actions progress. In another, rival attorneys
file in different courts, hoping to seize control. In the third, failure in one court is followed by a second attempt in another
court, and perhaps on through several
courts until success is achieved.
One approach to these problems is
simple: the Supreme Court was wrong to
permit state courts to assert "personal" jurisdiction as to members of a plaintiff class
who have no meaningful connection to the
forum. Congress might be well advised to
adopt a statute limiting state court class actions to members who are citizens of the
state or who suffered tangible injury to person or property in the state. (An expansion
to include persons injured by "conduct in
the state" might prove too difficult to enforce.) That approach has not yet appeared
to commend itself to Congress.
Another approach is more sweeping.
Many of the bills in Congress, including
some passed by the House of Representatives, transfer jurisdiction of most class actions to federal courts. The basic method is
simple: original and removal federal jurisdiction are established if there is "minimal"
diversity, defined in terms of diversity between any single class member and any
single defendant. There are some qualifications. Thresholds are established to require
a minimum class size-100 is a common
figure-and a total amount in controversy-$2 million is a common figureand, more dangerously, jurisdiction is
ousted if a "substantial majority" of class
members and the "primary" defendants are
citizens of the state in which the action is
brought and the claims asserted will be
governed primarily by the laws of that
state.
It seems risky to make the existence of
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subject matter jurisdiction, with all of the
attending superstitions, depend on such
elusive determinations as the choice of
law. There is a further difficulty that a federal court must dismiss an action removed
from a state court if the federal court
denies certification. Then the plaintiffs can
start again in state court, but the new action
can be removed again, and dismissed
again, and so on in a circle without end.
Variations are easy to imagine. One of
the more attractive approaches may be to
rely on the federal Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, which could be
given discretionary authority, based on
minimal diversity, to determine whether to
remove, and whether to consolidate, state
court class actions.
Another approach would be to lodge authority in any federal court that has jurisdiction of a class action under present jurisdiction rules. That court could enjoin
rival state actions, or else abstain in favor
of a rival state action.
It is possible that some help could be
found in court rules. The Advisory Committee prepared draft rules that would do
several things. A federal court that refused
class certification could direct that no other
court should certify substantially the same
class unless changes of law or fact create a
different certification issue. Once a federal
court has refused to approve a class action
settlement, no other court could approve
substantially the same settlement on behalf
of substantially the same class. And a federal court with a pending class action could
enjoin class members from pursuing class
actions (or, in one variation, individual actions) in any other court.
These proposals raise substantial questions of authority under the Rules Enabling
Act,' and they also must confront the statute that limits federal power to enjoin state
court proceedings. 2 They were widely distributed for informal comment. The Advisory Committee comment stressed the
1.
2.
3.
4.

28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077.
28 U.S.C. § 2283.
521 U.S. 591 (1997).
527 U.S. 815 (1998).

question whether court rules can properly
address these problems as between federal
courts and state courts. It is not likely that
these proposals will be taken up by the Advisory Committee in the near future.
The prospect for legislation remains uncertain. For those who seek change, that is
more encouraging than the prospect for
rulemaking. But there is another and perhaps still more encouraging prospect. It has
become commonplace to say that the problem is not a problem identified by states.
Rather, it is a problem identified by counties. And the problem county courts shift as
appellate courts take control and bring
some measure of order in one state after
another. It is possible that in a few years
the most glaring excesses will disappear
without any federal intervention.
WHERE WE MAY BE GOING:
MORE RULES?
The Advisory Committee does not regard its Rule 23 duties as discharged. The
topics that remain on the agenda, however,
may prove more controversial than any of
those that have advanced to the formal
publication stage in the past.
A. Settlement Classes
Settlement classes will be the subject of
active consideration. The Federal Judicial
Center is conducting a study that aims to
measure the effects of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Amchem Products Inc. v.
Windsor3 and Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp.4 It
seems clear already that courts continue to
certify classes for settlement only. It is not
clear whether it will be desirable to adopt
an express rule, either to capture and express the best developing practices or to
establish new directions.
The conflicting pressures are obvious.
Settlements can resolve many claims, cutting across many of the problems that
would make litigated resolutions uncertain,
expensive, and, if not managed on a class
basis, inconsistent. Settlement classes are
attractive not only to plaintiffs and courts,
but also, when the right terms are achieved,
to defendants who seek "global peace."
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At the same time, a settlement is simply
one deal negotiated in a setting that could
support many different deals. A settlement
may obscure conflicts of interest within a
class. In many ways, the things that make a
settlement most attractive can be re-described by saying that they also make a
settlement lawless. Settlements also raise
the specter of the "reverse auction," in
which defendants play on the fear of any
given set of class representatives that if
they do not make the deal, someone else
will.
It is too early to predict whether there
will be any settlement class rule, much less
what it might look like.
B. "Futures" Claims
Perhaps the most poignant-and also intractable--questions arise from the subset
of settlement classes that involves "futures" claims on behalf of tort victims who,
"amorphous and unselfconscious," have no
present injury, may not be aware of a past
exposure that creates a risk of latent injury,
and may not yet even have been exposed.
There may be no plausible means of giving
notice that has meaning to many of these
potential plaintiffs. Even those with notice
may have little incentive to seek to monitor
whatever means of representation is provided for them. The prospect of finally disposing of their "rights," relying only on
court-approved representation, is obviously
unsettling, but in some circumstances there
may be no other way to protect their rights.
There is a strong incentive to do something for future plaintiffs in circumstances
that threaten exhaustion of all available
compensation before the future claims are
addressed. The "limited fund" class action
has been made virtually unavailable in this
setting as a matter of present Rule 23(b)(1).
The difficulty with the limited fund
theory mirrors the intrinsic difficulty that
must be confronted by any proposal: how
to make a workable estimate of the number, severity, and cash value of future
claims? The National Bankruptcy Review
Commission has made a proposal to bring
these problems into the bankruptcy system,
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with appointment of a mass future claims
representative, but the proposal does not
offer any advance in thinking about the
problem of making a meaningful "estimation" of the future claims.
The Advisory Committee will continue
to study these problems, but they may
elude any workable answer.
C. Binding Class Members
A more familiar question also remains
on the agenda. Rule 23(b)(3) seems to rely
on the theory that a class member who has
notice of a class action and who fails to
request exclusion has made an intelligent
choice to be represented in, and bound by,
the action. Perhaps it relies only on the
lesser theory that any class member who
would seriously think about bringing an individual action has made an intelligent
choice, while others need be of no concern
because their "rights" have no meaning
anyway. Anyone who has been a class
member can testify to the obscurity of class
action notices. Perhaps due process requires notices that few can understand and
that very few will attempt to understand.
An opt-in class offers quite a different
alternative. The Advisory Committee has
studied several versions of an opt-in rule.
The most aggressive approach would be to
convert all Rule 23(b)(3) actions to opt-in
classes, discarding the opt-out approach. A
more moderate approach would authorize
creation of opt-in classes when the requirements for certifying a (b)(3) opt-out class
are not met. This approach might seem to
expand the reach of Rule 23 without any
offsetting limit, but class action proponents
have regularly challenged the assumption
that the availability of an opt-in class alternative would not affect administration of
Rule(b)(3). Their view is that a court faced
with a difficult (b)(3) certification question, or a court hostile to the rights asserted
in a (b)(3) action, would fall back on an
opt-in certification as a less worrisome alternative.
Again, it is easy to predict that these
questions will stir vigorous controversy,
and it is too early to venture any prediction
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whether any opt-in alternative will be proposed, much less what it might be.

The book is not closed. Other Rule 23
proposals might be revived or imagined for

way back, and the pace of revision since
then does not suggest that further changes
will come soon. Three and a half years
would be the earliest time possible for a
new rule to take effect. The very deliberate
approach to Rule 23 suggests that five

the first time. But 1991 is already a long

years is a more realistic minimum estimate.

THERE'S NO END

